

## A Short History of CULCON

### The Post-War Exchange of Intellectuals Between Japan and the United States

The purpose of this document is to discuss the history of CULCON and the activities of the intellectuals who were involved. The United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON) is a binational advisory panel that aims to “elevate and strengthen the vital cultural and educational foundations of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and to strengthen connections between U.S. and Japan leadership in those fields.” Academics usually discuss cultural exchange policies, especially those of the United States, as part of U.S. diplomatic strategies to form pro-American public opinion.<sup>1</sup> However, this document will instead focus on the interaction between Japan and the United States, particularly the interaction of intellectuals. Such an angle would make clear that the history of CULCON was built by the Japanese and American panelists who were involved.

The history explored in this document commences in the 1950s. In discussing CULCON, the 1950s are important for two reasons. First, due to the Japanese protests against the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan (“Anpo”), the Eisenhower administration and the U.S. Congress felt a stronger sense of distrust towards Japan. They saw the Anpo protests as a reflection of the weakness of the Japanese economy, as well as a Japanese desire to disengage from the United States. They perceived the protests as a major problem, even discussing it in Congress and exploring how to improve relations with Japan. The United States

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<sup>1</sup> Tsuchiya, Yuka. *Shinbei Nihon no Kochiku: America no Tainichi Joho, Kyoiku Seisaku to Nihon Senryo (Constructing a Pro-U.S. Japan: U.S. Information and Education Policy and the Occupation of Japan)*. Kusunoki, Ayako. “Reisen to Nichibei Chiteki Koryu: Shimoda Kaigi (1967) no Ichi Kosatsu (U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange During the Cold War: Thoughts on the Shimoda Conference (1967)).” *Kwansei Gakuin Kokusaigaku Kenkyu (Kwansei Gakuin Journal of International Studies)*, Vol. 3, No.1 (2014).  
Matsuda, Takeshi. *Taibei Izon no Kigen: America no Soft Power Senryaku (Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency)* (Iwanami Shoten, 2015).  
Matsuda, Takeshi. “Nichibei Anpo Taisei wo Sasaeru Nichibei ‘Bunka/Kyoiku’ Network no Kochiku: ‘Nichibei Bunka Kyoiku Koryu Inkaishi’ Setsuritsu no Haikai wo Chushin ni (Building the U.S.-Japan ‘Cultural and Educational’ Network to Support The Anpo Framework: The History Behind the Founding of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange).” in *Reisen to Domei: Reisen Shuen no Shiten kara (The Cold War and Alliances: From the Perspective of the End of the Cold War)*, ed. Hideki Kan (Shoraisha, 2014), p. 387-416.  
Belmonte, Laura A. *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).  
Cull, Nicholas J. “Reading, Viewing, and Tuning in to the Cold War”. Leffler, Melvyn P. and Westad, Odd Arne eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II: Crises and Détente* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2010).  
Osgood, Kenneth. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Front* (University Press of Kansas, 2006).

ultimately felt a need to understand Japanese culture and earn the support of Japanese intellectuals, especially in light of the escalating Cold War.

Second, the 1950s was when the “Japan-U.S. Intellectual Exchange Plan,” which aimed to deepen the mutual understanding between the two countries by promoting the exchange of intellectuals, was established. This was different from other examples of cultural diplomacy until then, which were strongly influenced by the American occupation. The Japan-U.S. Intellectual Exchange Plan was formed through negotiations between Shigeharu Matsumoto, who was the Chair of the International House of Japan, and John D. Rockefeller III, who played a major role in cultural exchange and diplomacy with Japan.<sup>2</sup> These two individuals created the basis of what would later become CULCON in the 1960s. To sum, the 1950s was relevant in that it illustrated a strong need in both Japan and the United States for an institution like CULCON, and brought together two people who built the foundation for it.

#### From the Anpo Protests and Japan-U.S. Intellectual Exchange to the Establishment of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (1950s)

When working on the Treaty of Peace with Japan, one of the important objectives for the United States was bringing Japan into the Western camp. Therefore, the United States focused on not only security issues, but also cooperation and propaganda efforts in the fields of economy and culture.<sup>3</sup> U.S. State Department officials pointed out that Japanese intellectuals harbored “anti-American sentiment and a desire to remain neutral,” and this in turn made efforts to engage intellectuals a priority.<sup>4</sup> That approach toward intellectuals continued under the Eisenhower administration through the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange. Around this time, even while strengthening anti-communist policies, the U.S. Congress passed the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act). For the first time in U.S. history, public diplomacy and propaganda policies

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<sup>2</sup> Fujita, Fumiko. *America Bunka Gaiko to Nihon (American Cultural Diplomacy and Japan)*, (Tokyo University Press, 2015), Ch. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Tsuchiya, *op. cit.*; Kusunoki, *op. cit.*; Belmonte, *op. cit.*; Cull, *op.cit.*; Osgood, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Tsuchiya, *op. cit.*; Kusunoki, *op. cit.*

during peacetime were established.<sup>5</sup> Thus, in light of the ongoing Cold War, under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, both the White House and the Congress prioritized diplomatic relations with Japan.<sup>6</sup>

In 1951, President Truman appointed John Foster Dulles as the head of a Japanese peace mission. Dulles was sent to Japan to facilitate discussions regarding the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Dulles then invited Rockefeller—who was known in Japan as a philanthropist with a strong interest in educational and cultural programs in East Asia—to join the peace mission as a cultural advisor.<sup>7</sup> While visiting Japan, Rockefeller met and exchanged opinions with individuals that include Shigeru Yoshida; Aisuke Kabayama, Chair of the Grew Scholarship Foundation; and Hisaakira Kano of the Kokusai Bunka Kyokai (International Cultural Association). Prominent Japanese intellectuals Rockefeller met included Shigeru Nanbara, President of the University of Tokyo; Risaburo Torigai, President of Kyoto University; and Professors Yasaka Takagi and Masamichi Royama of the University of Tokyo. Rockefeller also met with Matsumoto, an old friend who was an international attorney, a number of times.<sup>8</sup> Upon returning to the United States, Rockefeller submitted a report to Dulles, which was then sent to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson. This report, titled “United States-Japan Cultural Relations,” declared that culture, in addition to politics and the economy, was important to rebuild U.S.-Japan relations after the peace treaty came into effect. The report also stated that humility in learning from each other is also important in cultural exchanges, which are crucial for mutual understanding.<sup>9</sup>

Based on this, Rockefeller and others began to promote the establishment of organizations and bases that would become the foundation of intellectual and cultural

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<sup>5</sup> For the Smith-Mundt Act, see: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith%E2%80%93Mundt\\_Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith%E2%80%93Mundt_Act).

The following publications provide further details on the passing of this act:

Sawada, Misa. “Fulbright Program no Tanjo 1: Sengo America no Riso Shugi to Pragmatism (Birth of the Fulbright Program 1: Post-War American Idealism and Pragmatism)” *Hogakuronso (Journal of Legal Studies)* 139(6), 23-42, 1996-09

Sawada, Misa. “Fulbright Program no Tanjo 2: Sengo America no Riso Shugi to Pragmatism (Birth of the Fulbright Program 2: Post-War American Idealism and Pragmatism)” *Hogakuronso (Journal of Legal Studies)* 141(4), 76-96, 1997-07

<sup>6</sup> Kapur, Nick. “Mending the “Broken Dialogue: U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis.” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2017).

<sup>7</sup> Matsuda, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Fujita, *op. cit.*, p. 203-204.

Matsuda, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.

Gould Ashizawa, Kimberly. “America no Philanthropy wa Nihon ni Do Mukiatanoka (Understanding the ‘Other’: Foundation Support for Japanese Studies in the United States)” in *Sengo Nichibei Kankei to Philanthropy: Minkan Zaidan ga Hatashita Yakuwari (Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations)*, ed., Tadashi Yamamoto (Minerva Press, 2008), p. 75-107.

Kato, Mikio. *Rockefeller-ke to Nihon: Nichibei Koryu wo Tsumuida Hitobito (The Rockefellers and Japan: Five Generations Spanning the Pacific)* (Iwanami Shoten, 2015).

<sup>9</sup> Kato, Mikio, ed. *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan 50-nen no Ayumi (International House of Japan: 1952-2002)*, (International House of Japan, 2003), p. 5-6.

exchange between the United States and Japan.<sup>10</sup> Rockefeller immediately created the “Cultural Center Preparatory Committee,” which would work to establish cultural centers. Aisuke Kabayama was selected as committee chair, and Matsumoto and Sterling W. Fisher (General Manager for the Far East at Readers Digest) were selected as executive secretaries. Takagi became one of the committee members, and Shigeru Nanbara, President of the University of Tokyo, became a subcommittee member.<sup>11</sup> The work of these individuals came to fruition in 1955 as the International House of Japan.<sup>12</sup>

The idea then emerged that these exchanges should be bidirectional. The exchange plan was to be implemented by panels representing both the United States and Japan, and the U.S. Panel, with support from the Rockefeller Foundation, was to be based in the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. The preparatory committee in Japan was attended by Hugh Borton, who was the Deputy Director of the East Asian Institute and a scholar specializing in Japanese history. Borton, who had lived in Japan and been involved in American occupation policies, attended each meeting and continued preparation efforts with Matsumoto and others. The Japan-U.S. Intellectual Exchange Plan, which enabled Japanese and American intellectuals to visit each other’s countries, developed through these discussions. In 1957, the Japan Panel suggested that the exchange plan be terminated in two years. The U.S. Panel agreed, and operations were transferred to the Japan Society in New York. The Japan Panel put the International House of Japan in charge of the Intellectual Exchange Plan. With this, the Japan-U.S. Intellectual Exchange Plan came to an end.<sup>13</sup>

However, despite these intellectual exchanges, U.S.-Japan relations continued to worsen. The cause was the Anpo protests. As Kan points out, the mid- to late 1950s were when the U.S. Government was most concerned about Japan’s desire to remain neutral and disengage from the United States.<sup>14</sup> Anti-American sentiment in Japan, which was already high due to opposition to U.S. military bases, was further inflamed by the Girard Incident in 1957.<sup>15</sup> Based on such public opinion, the Kishi cabinet advocated for negotiations to revise the security treaty.<sup>16</sup> U.S. Government officials also believed that they needed to respond to negotiations in order to assuage angry

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<sup>10</sup> Matsuda, *op. cit.*, Ch.5.; Kato, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> Fujita, *op. cit.*, p. 205; Matsuda, *op.cit.*, p. 102-103.

<sup>12</sup> Matsuda, *op. cit.*, p. 114-116.

<sup>13</sup> Fujita, *op. cit.*, p. 206-217.

<sup>14</sup> Kan, Hideki. *Reisen to ‘America no Seiki’: Asia ni Okeru ‘Hikoshiki Teikoku’ no Chitsujo Keisei (The Cold War and the ‘American Century’: An ‘Informal Empire’ and the Making of International Order in Asia)* (Iwanami Shoten, 2016), p. 106.

Miller, Jennifer M. *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* (Harvard University Press, 2019), Ch. 4.

<sup>15</sup> For information on the Girard Incident, see: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Girard\\_incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Girard_incident).

<sup>16</sup> Hiwatari, Yumi. *Sengo Seiji to Nichibei Kankei (Postwar Politics and U.S.-Japan Relations)* (Tokyo University Press, 1990), p. 151-164.

Japanese citizens who thought the treaty was unfair.<sup>17</sup> But in 1960, the Diet deliberated the Treaty, and Japanese citizens took to the streets, which evolved into the Anpo protests. Facing such strong opposition by Japanese citizens, Eisenhower's visit to Japan had to be canceled.

The Eisenhower administration did not have the momentum to rebuild U.S.-Japan relations. Opinions that saw the Anpo protests as the cumulative result of U.S. policy towards Japan, and thought that the policy ought to be corrected in a way that protects Japan's vital interests through economic cooperation, were rare. In an opinion piece in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Professor Edwin Reischauer of Harvard University, who was already known then as a Japan hand, showed understanding towards the Anpo protests, and criticized how the Eisenhower administration underestimated the Japanese citizens' opposition. But the U.S. Government did not share this view. Many senior government officials continued to blame Japan for the turmoil of the Anpo protests or saw it as a communist conspiracy, and argued that diplomacy with Japan should remain the way it was.<sup>18</sup>

One of the primary goals of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and his cabinet was improving Japan-U.S. relations. Ikeda's predecessor, Nobusuke Kishi, and his cabinet had all resigned following the revision of the security treaty. Ikeda sent Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Koichiro Asakai to Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon and conveyed his intentions to improve relations. However, as mentioned earlier, the Eisenhower administration never changed its policies.<sup>19</sup>

It was only after the Kennedy administration was established that the U.S. stance finally changed. The turmoil surrounding the revision of the security treaty shocked senior officials within the administration, such as McGeorge Bundy (National Security Advisor to President Kennedy) as well as Walt Rostow (Bundy's deputy). Intent on improving relations with Japan, Kennedy prepared to invite Ikeda to the United States immediately after becoming President. He sent Robert Kennedy—his younger brother who was the Attorney General—to Japan and tried to foster pro-American sentiment.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, despite opposition from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other State Department officials, he appointed Reischauer, who had strong connections with Japan and had been empathetic to Japan's perspective during the Anpo protests, as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. This appointment was especially welcomed by intellectuals.

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<sup>17</sup> Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 105-108; Hiwatari, *op. cit.*, p. 156-164.

<sup>18</sup> Kapur, *op. cit.*; Miller, *op. cit.*, Ch. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Kapur, *op. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> Kapur, Nick. *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise After Anpo* (Harvard University Press. 2018), p. 49-54.

Bundy, Rostow, Reischauer and others asked Kennedy to improve U.S.-Japan relations by reaching out more often to Japanese citizens, as well as replacing their high-handed attitude with a more cooperative approach.

This stance by the Kennedy administration was just what the Ikeda administration, which had been trying to improve U.S.-Japan relations since the Eisenhower era, had been waiting for. At a summit held in June 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy discussed the establishment of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (which later became CULCON) and the U.S.-Japan Trade and Economic Joint Committee. The Kennedy administration was planning on improving the Eisenhower-era foreign policy towards Japan, eliminate Japan's distrust towards the United States, and incorporate Japan further into the Western camp. The Ikeda administration also saw these summit meetings as opportunities to deepen U.S.-Japan relations and improve Japan's global status.<sup>21</sup> The U.S.-Japan Trade and Economic Joint Committee aimed to "eliminate discrepancies in international economic policies between the two countries and promote economic cooperation." It was established to discuss issues of trade and aid to developing countries, and comprised cabinet members responsible for fields that include foreign affairs, finance, agriculture and forestry, trade, and labor. Meanwhile, the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange and the "United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation" were established to make proposals and recommendations on measures that were necessary for bilateral exchange and cooperation in the fields of education, culture, science, and technology. It was decided that these meetings would discuss topics such as people-to-people exchange, exchange of resources, and joint research. Furthermore, these meetings would be held regularly, with the aim to resolve misunderstandings and promote understanding in both the public and private sectors.<sup>22</sup>

To sum, the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange was established in the context of revitalizing U.S.-Japan intellectual exchange in the 1950s, as well as improving bilateral relations that had worsened overall due to the turmoil surrounding the revision of the security treaty.

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<sup>21</sup> Suzuki, Hirohisa. *Ikeda Seiken to Kodo Keizai Seichoki no Nihon Gaiko (The Ikeda Administration and Japanese Diplomacy During the Period of Rapid Economic Growth)* (Keio University Press, 2012; Kusunoki, *op. cit.*; Mo Lun Hai, *Sengo Nihon no Taigai Bunka Seisaku: 1952nen kara 1972nen ni okeru Saihensei no Mosaku (Public Diplomacy in Post-War Japan: Exploring the Realignment from 1952 to 1972)* (Waseda University Press, 2016), Ch. 3, Section 3.

Based on primary sources, Kusunoki in particular indicates that the Kennedy administration leveraged these meetings to maintain Japanese administrations with moderate Western thought. Mo uses primary sources to detail the summit talks that led to the establishment of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.

<sup>22</sup> "CULCON: The United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange: A Brief History" (1978).

The Dawn of the United States-Japan Conference  
on Cultural and Educational Interchange  
(Early 1960s)

Among the people who served as panelists of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange were those who played a major role in U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange Plan in the 1950s, as well as people who visited the United States as participants of the Plan. This included: Matsumoto, who was the Chair of the International House and a strong advocate for the Plan; Rockefeller; Borton; President of Hitotsubashi University Ichiro Nakayama (who visited the United States on the Plan in 1955); and President of Hiroshima University Tatsuo Morito, who served as Chair of the Japan Panel (visited the United States in 1958). The U.S. Panel also included participants who had visited Japan through the Plan, such as President of Amherst College Charles W. Cole (visited Japan from 1952 to 1953) and Amherst Professor Willard L. Thorp (visited Japan in 1955). The Rockefeller Foundation actively provided panelists, including Charles Fahs, a researcher on Japan. In this way, the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange was an extension of the U.S.-Japan intellectual exchange in the 1950s.<sup>23</sup> Reischauer's and Fah's appointments (as Ambassador to Japan and Minister-Counselor for Cultural and Public Affairs at the U.S. Embassy, respectively) and their role as panelists representing the government helped propel this movement.

In January 1962, the first United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange was held in Tokyo. Attendees included those like Takagi and Fahs who supported intellectual exchange in the 1950s. Additional participants included Ryuji Takeuchi (Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs), Yosaburo Naito (Vice-Minister of Education), and Ambassador Reischauer. At this Conference, the participants discussed topics that included: language education, joint research and seminars, the establishment of institutions facilitating exchange, support for the arts, support for exchange students, and the translation of Japanese thought and academic research.<sup>24</sup> Around the time of this Conference, exchanges between Japan and the United States were limited, and

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<sup>23</sup> Kusunoki, *op. cit.*, points out that intellectual exchange in the 1960s was an extension of the activities undertaken by the International House of Japan in the 1950s.

<sup>24</sup> "Bunka Oyobi Kyoiku no Koryu ni Kansuru Nichibei Godo Kaigi no Saishu Communiqué (Final Communiqué of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange), January 31, 1962" *Diplomatic Bluebook #6* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1962), p. 48-52.

systems to support exchanges, such as orientations, counseling, and language training, were insufficient. Participants advocated to strengthen such systems, and pointed out that there were not enough teachers or proper textbooks to provide language training. Based on difficulties obtaining foreign books through libraries, participants also voiced a strong need for more translated books.<sup>25</sup>

The subsequent Conference, held in 1963, was attended by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to President Kennedy. The purpose of the 1963 Conference was stated as follows:

Mindful that knowledge and understanding breed confidence and friendship, just as ignorance and misunderstanding generate fear and suspicion, the Conference sought new approaches to broadening the spectrum of cultural and educational exchanged between the two countries.<sup>26</sup>

#### The Specialization and Institutionalization of Educational and Cultural Exchange (Late 1960s to 1970s)

However, this kind of interest by top-level government officials did not last long. The only time a Japanese official at the vice-minister level attended was in 1962. Schlesinger's attendance in 1963 was the only time a U.S. official at the level of a special assistant to the president or cabinet secretary attended. Working-level discussions continued in subsequent years. During that time, various systems within the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange were set in place.

During the administrations of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Johnson, cultural and educational policies became less of a priority as Japan and the United States focused on the return of Ogasawara Islands and Okinawa, as well as the

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<sup>25</sup> Nakaya, Kenichi. "Nichibei Bunka Kyouiku Kaigi no Seika (The Outcome of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange)," *Nichibei Forum (Japan-America Forum)* (Beikoku Taishikan Bunka Kokankyoku Shuppanbu, 1962), Vol. 8.

Nobori, Amiko, and Tamaki Nobuhiko. "Partnership no Keisei to Henyo: 1960 Nendai (The Formation and Transformation of Partnerships: 1960s)," Shadan Hojin Nichibei Kyokai ed., *Mou hitotsu no Nichibei Kouryushi: Nichibei Kyokai Shiryo de Yomu 20 Seiki (Another History of U.S.-Japan Exchange: 20<sup>th</sup> Century History As Studied Through Resources at the America-Japan Society)* (Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2012).

<sup>26</sup> "Bunka Oyobi Kyoiku no Koryu ni Kansuru Dainikai Nichibei Godo Kaigi no Saishu Communiqué (Final Communiqué of the Second United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange), October 22, 1963," *Diplomatic Bluebook #8* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1964), p. 32-36.



Vietnam War.<sup>27</sup> By 1963, participants from the Japanese government were at the director-general level or individuals in honorary posts. From 1966 onwards, the U.S. attendees were mostly at the assistant secretary level. At the same time, the agenda items and discussions became more specific over time. The fifth United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange, held in 1970, discussed the exchange of media professionals, information related to industrial international exchange activities, the exchange of students and teachers, the promotion of mutual understanding in schools, information exchange on youth issues, and exchange centered around television shows. The more specific the issues became, the more cultural exchange became institutionalized.<sup>28</sup>

This was also when the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange began to be separated from bilateral trade issues and political issues. At the U.S.-Japan Trade and Economic Joint Committee (which was established at the same time as the Conference), serious problems such as the U.S. international deficit were being discussed, and the conflict between the two countries was becoming more apparent.<sup>29</sup> In terms of the Vietnam War, which was becoming a greater quagmire, Matsumoto, who was one of the Japanese panelists, openly criticized the United States in a magazine article and caused a temporary rift with Reischauer.<sup>30</sup> The United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange recognized “political and economic issues,” but as a whole, focused on deep discussions on ways to promote mutual understanding in education and culture. This was in stark contrast to the Shimoda Conference, a bilateral private sector meeting that was held around the same time. The Shimoda Conference also aimed to promote exchange between intellectuals of both countries, but according to Kusunoki, it was also an “occasion for frank opinion exchange.” At the Shimoda Conference, Okinawa and Ogasawara, the Vietnam War,

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<sup>27</sup> Masaki, Sho. *Kaku Mitsuyaku kara Okinawa Mondai e (The Untold Link between the Bonin and Ryukyu Reversions)* (Nagoya University Press, 2017).

Nakajima, Takuma. *Okinawa Henkan to Nichibei Anpo Taisei (Reversion of Okinawa and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements)*, (Yuhikaku, 2012).

<sup>28</sup> “Daigokai Nichibei Bunka Kyoiku Kaigi Saishu Communiqué (Final Communiqué on the Fifth United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange), March 23, 1970, *Diplomatic Bluebook #14* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1970), p. 405-408.

<sup>29</sup> Takahashi, Kazuhiro. *Doru Boei to Nichibei Kankei: Kodo Seicho ki Nihon no Keizai Gaiko 1959-1969 nen (Defending the Dollar: The U.S. Balance of Payment Problems and Japan-U.S. Relations 1959-1969)* (Chikura Shobo, 2018).

<sup>30</sup> Kaimai, Jun. *Matsumoto Shigeharu den: Saigo no Liberalist (A Biography of Shigeharu Matsumoto: The Last Liberalist)* (Fujiwara Shoten, 2009), p. 408-413.

and other difficult issues between Japan and the United States were discussed, which were then reflected in summaries.<sup>31</sup>

During this period, systems surrounding the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange rapidly developed. At the 1968 Conference, attendees agreed upon the establishment of the Joint Committee on Japan-United States Cultural and Educational Cooperation, which would continuously explore and recommend activities concerning cultural and educational relations between the two countries.<sup>32</sup> It was decided that the members of this committee (seven from each country) would meet in Hawaii in years when the Conference was not held, and that costs would be split between the governments of both countries. Furthermore, a number of subcommittees, which were expected to discuss more specialized topics, were established under the Joint Committee.<sup>33</sup>

Under the leadership of John W. Hall and Yoshinori Maeda, the chairs of the U.S. and Japan panels, the financial base of the Conference was rapidly built during this time. This was an important development. Maeda was the Chair of NHK, and Hall was a researcher on Japan and professor at the Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures at Yale University. In the 1970s, political leaders once again came to recognize the importance of educational and cultural exchange. President Nixon, who had won the election by criticizing how the Johnson administration pushed for U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, announced the Nixon Doctrine, which sought not only a “Peace with Honor” withdrawal from the Vietnam War, but also a reduced U.S. military presence. This resulted in a sense of crisis in the Government of Japan, which feared that the U.S.-Japan alliance may be undermined.<sup>34</sup> U.S.-Japan relations further worsened through the Nixon Shock and related problems in international currency, surcharges on imports, and the liberalization of trade and capital. Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda, who served in Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s cabinet, set out to expand funding for cultural and people-to-people exchange between the United States and Japan. With support from both the ruling and opposition parties, the Japan Foundation

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<sup>31</sup> “Daigokai Nichibei Bunka Kyoiku Kaigi Saishu Communiqué (Final Communiqué on the Fifth United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange), March 23, 1970, *Diplomatic Bluebook #14* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1970), p. 405-408.

Kusunoki, Ayako. *Reisen to Nichibei Chiteki Koryu: Shimada Kaigi (1967) no Ichi Kosatu (U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange during the Cold War: The Shimoda Conference in 1967)*.

<sup>32</sup> Kusunoki, Ayako. “Kokusai Koryu Kikin no Setsuritsu: Nichibei Kankei no Kiki to Nihon Gaiko no Ishiki Henyo (The Establishment of the Japan Foundation: The Crisis in U.S.-Japan Relations and the Change in Mindset of Japanese Diplomacy)” in Fukunaga Fumio, ed., *Daini no ‘Sengo’ no Keisei Katei: 1970 nendai Nihon no Seijiteki / Gaikoteki Saihen (The Formation of the Second ‘Post-War’ Era: The Political and Diplomatic Realignment of 1970s Japan)* (Yuhikaku, 2015).

<sup>33</sup> Mo, *op. cit.*, p. 161-162.

<sup>34</sup> Yoshida, Shingo. *Nichibei Domei no Seidoka: Hatten to Shinkai no Rekishi Katei (The Institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: A History of Its Development and Growth)* (Nagoya University Press, 2012), Ch. 3.

was established.<sup>35</sup> The preparatory committee for the Japan Foundation comprised Matsumoto (a Japanese panelist of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange), Nakayama, Yoshinori Maeda, President of Kyodo News Service Shintaro Fukushima, Vice President of Nippon Steel Heigo Fujii, and Tokyo University Professor Emeritus Yoichi Maeda. Nakayama served as Regional Chair and Fukushima served as Administrative Chair. Japan announced the establishment of the Japan Foundation at the 1972 United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange, and the United States gave high praise to Japan's initiative.<sup>36</sup> Funds for the Fulbright Program, which had been the main financial resource for exchanges since 1964, were almost running out, and both American and Japanese participants of the Conference were unhappy that Japan was not sharing the burden.<sup>37</sup> The fact that the Japan side was budgeting for exchanges by establishing the Japan Foundation was a welcome change.

Inspired by the Japan Foundation, the U.S. participants of the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange began to petition for the establishment of a similar organization in the United States. This is how the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission (JUSFC) came to be. John Hall (who had long served as the Chair of the U.S. Panel of the Conference), Robert Ward (a professor at Stanford University who would become the Chair of U.S. Panel after JUSFC was established), Reischauer, and James W. Morley (a professor of Politics at Columbia University and Director of the East Asian Institute) were among those who spoke to Senator Jacob Javits and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green, calling for the establishment of the Japan-United States Friendship Act.<sup>38</sup> Reflecting discussions at the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange, the bill clearly positioned JUSFC as a government agency that would implement the recommendations of the Conference. The Act was passed in 1975

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<sup>35</sup> Kusunoki, *op. cit.*, 2015; Mo, *op. cit.*, Ch. 8; Kokusai Koryu Kikin 15-nenshi Hensan Inikai, *Kokusai Koryu Kikin 15-nen no Ayumi (The 15-Year History of the Japan Foundation)* (Japan Foundation, 1990).

<sup>36</sup> Kokusai Koryu Kikin 15-nenshi Hensan Inikai, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>37</sup> Mo, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

"Final Communiqué of the 4<sup>th</sup> United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange." March 7, 1966

"Final Communiqué of the 4<sup>th</sup> United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange." April 8, 1968

<sup>38</sup> "The Letter to Marshall Green." United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, ed., *Japan-United States Friendship Act* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

in conjunction with Emperor Showa's first visit to the United States, and JUSFC was established.<sup>39</sup>

The 1976 Conference, held a year after the JUSFC was founded, put forth a communiqué welcoming JUSFC and Japan Foundation as “valuable new contributors to the expanded cultural relationship between Japan and the United States.”<sup>40</sup>

With the establishment of the Japan Foundation and JUSFC, the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange now had platforms in both Japan and the United States to implement the policies it proposed. In 1975, based on a recommendation by the Conference, the Japan Foundation published a book called *Nihonjin no Kimochi wo Eigo de Arawasu Niwa... (To Express Japanese Feelings in English...)*.<sup>41</sup> By 1978, both Japan and the United States came to refer to the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange as “CULCON.”

### The Development of Subcommittees (1980s)

With stable financial backing from the Japan Foundation on the Japan side and JUSFC on the U.S. side, CULCON set up subcommittees to discuss more specialized topics. By 1976, subcommittees had been established for the press, museum exchange, education promoting global understanding, American studies, Japan studies, and libraries, enabling technical discussions in each field.<sup>42</sup>

Meanwhile, several CULCON panelists were replaced during the 1980s. Under the Japan-United States Friendship Act, the Chair of CULCON's U.S. Panel was also required to serve as the Chair of the JUSFC. This was a political appointment that had to be nominated by the U.S. President and approved by the Senate. Naturally, the budget of the Commission was also subject to deliberations by the U.S. Congress. Therefore, compared to the 1970s when those processes did not exist, CULCON was now more

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<sup>39</sup> For more information on the Japan-United States Friendship Act, see: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan-United\\_States\\_Friendship\\_Act\\_of\\_1975](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan-United_States_Friendship_Act_of_1975)

For further details on its history, see:

Tenny, Francis B. “The Japan-United States Friendship Commission: A History of the Commission Commemorating the 20th Anniversary, 1975-1995.”

<sup>40</sup> “Final Communiqué of the 8th United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.” May 28, 1976.

<sup>41</sup> Kokusai Koryu Kikin 30-nenshi Hensan Iinkai. *Kokusai Koryu Kikin 30-nen no Ayumi (The 30-Year History of the Japan Foundation)* (Japan Foundation, 1990), p. 37.

<sup>42</sup> “Final Communiqué of the 7th United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.” “Final Communiqué of the 8th United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.” May 28, 1976

susceptible to political influences.<sup>43</sup> In 1984, the Chair of the U.S. Panel changed from Ward, one of the founders of JUSFC, to W. Glenn Campbell. Campbell was a conservative who was close to President Reagan, serving as chair of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. With the death of Maeda, the Chair of the Japan Panel also changed to Isao Masamune, Advising Director of the Industrial Bank of Japan.

In the 1980s, under the administrations of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and President Reagan, U.S.-Japan relations improved in terms of defense. Thanks to the "Ron-Yasu" friendship between the two leaders, as well as stronger working-level cooperation in defense, the friction that had been ongoing until the previous administration receded into the background. On the other hand, concern over the U.S. trade deficit with Japan mounted, bringing trade friction into sharp relief.<sup>44</sup>

At congressional budget hearings held in 1981, Ward, as Chair of JUSFC, showed his intent to include trade and economic structure as issues JUSFC would discuss.<sup>45</sup> In fact, the 1982 CULCON meeting addressed the growing dissatisfaction toward Japan by holding a symposium titled, "Cultural Factors in U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: In Relation to the Future of U.S.-Japan Cultural and Educational Exchanges."<sup>46</sup> Even after that, the U.S. Congress voiced skepticism regarding JUSFC's contributions in resolving trade and economic problems.<sup>47</sup> JUSFC responded to such concerns by emphasizing the economic and military importance of U.S.-Japan relations.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> For more information on political appointments, see: Lewis, David E. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance* (Princeton University Press).

<sup>44</sup> For further information on U.S.-Japan relations during this period, see: Wakatsuki, Hidekazu. *Reisen no Shuen to Nihon Gaiko: Suzuki, Nakasone, Takeshita Seiken no Gaiko (Japanese Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War: Foreign Policy under Suzuki, Nakasone and Takeshita 1980-1989)* (Chikura Shobo, 2017), Ch. 3.

<sup>45</sup> House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies. 1981. *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Appropriations for 1982*. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 46.

<sup>46</sup> CULCON (1982 Plenary Session), Final Communiqué. July 11, 1984.

<sup>47</sup> House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. 1983. *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1984, Part 2*. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 515.

House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. 1987. *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1990 Part 5: Related Agencies*. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 603.

<sup>48</sup> House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. 1987. *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1988, Part 3*. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 922.

House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. 1986. *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1987, Part 3*. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 959.

CULCON mostly kept its distance from this kind of economic conflict, and continued to operate meetings based on subcommittees that were formed in the 1970s. In 1984, CULCON established a special committee focused on publications, as well as a subcommittee focused on performing arts.<sup>49</sup> The former promoted translation and publishing, while the latter mainly promoted artistic activities. The hope was that the educational and cultural exchange between the two countries would curb the politicization of trade friction.<sup>50</sup>

CULCON panelists actively exchanged opinions on educational systems. At the 1984 CULCON meeting, based on a summit meeting between Nakasone and Reagan the year before, the U.S. Department of Education and the Japanese Ministry of Education agreed that experts of both countries would conduct studies on secondary education and the connection between secondary and higher education.<sup>51</sup> This research resulted in a report called “Japanese Education Today,” which was completed in 1987.<sup>52</sup>

#### From the Abolishment of Subcommittees to an Ad Hoc System (1990s to 2019)

In the late 1980s, as trade friction surrounding cars and semiconductors escalated, the United States came to see Japan even more as an economic threat. As with the Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal and the dispute surrounding the Defense Agency’s selection of FSX fighter planes, the single economic issue of trade spread to other fields and compounded problems. As the conflict between the United States and the USSR abated, turmoil in the Middle East came into greater focus. The United States demanded Japan’s contribution beyond the original parameters of the U.S.-Japan alliance, resulting in the deployment of Self-Defense Forces in the Persian Gulf.<sup>53</sup> This was also a period when revisionism toward Japan and theories on Japan’s oddness emerged in the United States, greatly impacting the latter’s policies.<sup>54</sup> Such trends were apparent in books such as *Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America and Japan*, written by John H. Makin of the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute. In this book,

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<sup>49</sup> “Final Communiqué of CULCON (1984 Plenary Session).” July 11, 1984.

<sup>50</sup> “Final Communiqué of CULCON (Provisional Translation).” October 28, 1988.

<sup>51</sup> “Final Communiqué of CULCON (1984 Plenary Session).” July 11, 1984.

<sup>52</sup> Gakusei 120 nenshi Henshu Inkai, “Gakusei 120 nenshi (The 120-Year History of Education)” (1992); A Special Task Force of the OERI Japan Study Team. “Japanese Education Today.” 1987 January. See: <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED275620>

<sup>53</sup> Suzuki, Kazutoshi. *Nichibei Kozo Kyogi no Seiji Katei (The Political Processes of the Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative)* (Minerva Shobo, 2013); Wakatsuki, *op. cit.* Ch. 6.

<sup>54</sup> Uriu, Robert M. *Clinton and Japan: The Impact of Revisionism on U.S. Trade Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

Makin discusses the United States' wariness of Japan's emergence as an economic threat, and in that context, criticizes the U.S.-Japan alliance.<sup>55</sup> Kenneth B. Pyle, a professor at the University of Washington's East Asia Center, took this even further. Reflecting upon Japan's foreign policy, Pyle argued that "Continuation of the postwar special relationship, which leaves the United States with major defense burdens and declining industrial competitiveness, is making the U.S. public understandably restless and impatient."<sup>56</sup> In the 1990s, Makin and Pyle both went on to serve as Chair of the U.S. Panel of CULCON. These appointments at CULCON were greatly influenced by the conflict between the United States and Japan.

The George H. W. Bush administration, which began in 1989, sought to further open Japan's markets through the U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative, but also shelved the Super 301 sanctions, which were strongly opposed in Japan. Overall, its foreign policy towards Japan was similar to previous administrations.<sup>57</sup> At the same time, CULCON was forced to undergo significant transformations. First, in 1991, based on the end of the Cold War and the rise of Japan's economy, Makin, then Chair of JUSFC, strongly criticized Japan by arguing, "The stability and certainty of the U.S.-Japan relationship that once formed our (harmonious) stance toward Japan is gone." In light of financial difficulties, he appealed to change JUSFC's role: instead of continuing to provide lump sum grants to universities, he wanted it to instead contribute to policy-shaping communities by analyzing the current political and economic state of Japan.<sup>58</sup> At the 1991 CULCON meeting, where Makin was Chair of the U.S. Panel, panelists agreed to abolish the previous subcommittees and instead begin to set up ad hoc task forces.<sup>59</sup> This stance continued under Pyle, who became Chair of JUSFC once Clinton became the U.S. President.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Makin, John H. "American Economic and Military Leadership in the Postwar Period" in Makin, John H. and Donald C. Hellman. *Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America and Japan* (The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), p17-66.

<sup>56</sup> Pyle, Kenneth B. "The Burden of Japanese History and the Politics of Burden Sharing" in Makin, John H. and Donald C. Hellman, *Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America and Japan* (The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), p. 67-115.

<sup>57</sup> Uriu, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

For more information on Super 301, see: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section\\_301\\_of\\_the\\_Trade\\_Act\\_of\\_1974](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_301_of_the_Trade_Act_of_1974)

<sup>58</sup> House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. 1991. *U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. Appropriations for 1992 Part 5: Related Agencies*. Government Printing Office. p. 738-740.

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992 Part 5: Related Agencies.

<sup>59</sup> "Chair's summary (provisional translation)." March 13-14, 1991.

<sup>60</sup> House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. 1993. *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1994 Part 6: Related Agencies*. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 930.

However, CULCON still discussed and implemented ways to expand cultural exchange. At the 1993 Conference, panelists discussed topics that could be explored in the future, such as undergraduate student exchange, comparison of broadcast and other media, and grassroots exchange, and agreed to establish working groups for “undergraduate exchange” and “cooperation with broadcast and other media.”<sup>61</sup> In 1995, CULCON recommended that regional art museums share their art and cohost exhibits, and based on the rise of the internet, agreed to set up a working group to study the “reciprocity of information access.”<sup>62</sup> The 1997 Conference discussed undergraduate student exchange and information access.<sup>63</sup> By this time, the peak of economic friction had passed. Instead, based on the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula, both the United States and Japan were seeking to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. This resulted in the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security,” which Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Clinton concluded in 1996.<sup>64</sup>

At the 1999 Conference, panelists agreed to establish a working group on digital culture, based on digitized materials on U.S.-Japan relations.<sup>65</sup> At the 2003 Conference, panelists recognized “cultural versatility” as an important characteristic of people who contribute to a globalized world, and decided to set up a “Global Leaders Working Group” that would research talent who had those characteristics.<sup>66</sup>

Beginning in 2006, CULCON rapidly began to reevaluate its activities. This was in line with the expansion of military cooperation between the two countries. In the early 2000s, the United States and Japan deepened their military cooperation through the Iraq War and the fight against terrorism, and by 2006, announced the “Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century.”<sup>67</sup> Security began to take a large portion of the discussions at CULCON as well. At the 2006 Conference, panelists decided to redefine

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<sup>61</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON XVI.” April 30, 1993.

<sup>62</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON XVII.” January 19-20, 1995.

<sup>63</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON XVIII.” May 8-9, 1997.

<sup>64</sup> In 1994, under the Social Democratic Party administration of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the “Higuchi Report” was submitted as part of a discussion on defense issues. This report discussed multilateral security in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but Japan hands within the Clinton administration thought that it downplayed the role of the United States. Meanwhile, even in the midst of economic friction, the Clinton administration recognized the importance of its relationship with Japan, as was evident in its 1995 report called “Strategy for East Asia.” As if in response, Japan showed its commitment to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance by releasing new National Defense Guidelines in FY 1997. For more on the above, see:

Shinoda, Tomohito. *Nichibei Domei to iu Realism (The Realism of the U.S.-Japan Alliance)* (Chikura Shobo, 2007), Ch. 6.

Shibata, Teruyoshi. *Reisengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku (Japan’s Defense Policies After the Cold War)* (Hokkaido University Press, 2011).

Akiyama, Masahiro. *Nichibei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta (U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogues Have Begun)* (Aki Shobo, 2002).

<sup>65</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON IXX.” February 18-19, 1999.

<sup>66</sup> Joint Statement. November 20-21, 2003.

<sup>67</sup> “Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century.” June 29, 2006.

[https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s\\_koi/cnd\\_usa\\_06/ju\\_doumei.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/cnd_usa_06/ju_doumei.html).



CULCON's mission. At a 2007 summit, Prime Minister Abe and President George W. Bush discussed strengthening intellectual exchange between the two countries and agreed to further reform CULCON.<sup>68</sup> Based on this summit meeting, CULCON panelists issued a 2008 report titled "Re-defining the Japan-U.S. Relationship," confirming their intent to revive and review the US-Japan alliance. The discussion on the U.S.-Japan alliance is as follows:

On the political and security fronts the changes have been equally stunning. Ikeda and Kennedy had to refer to the Japan-U.S. relationship as a "partnership" in their joint statement because the word "alliance" was considered too sensitive in Japan. Nevertheless, the Japanese public has supported the dispatch of self-defense forces abroad to provide logistical support in the Indian Ocean in the war against terrorism and humanitarian reconstruction in Iraq. In the G-8, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Six Party Talks on North Korea, American and Japanese diplomats coordinate strategies to enhance peace and prosperity for Asia and the world. In recent polls 92% of the American policy community said that they have confidence in Japan as a "trustworthy" ally.<sup>69</sup>

After reaffirming CULCON's role in leading cultural, educational, and intellectual exchange, which are valuable to U.S.-Japan relations, the report made the following policy proposals:<sup>70</sup>

1. Promote intellectual exchange through increasing opportunities for policy dialog, developing networks of public intellectuals between the two countries and further promoting media exchanges.
2. Continue to foster interest in Japan among Americans and interest in the United States among Japanese through programs that focus on language education and cross-cultural communications skills for young Japanese and Americans. Invest in language education at an early age, teacher development, and high school and undergraduate exchange.
3. Solidify existing grassroots exchanges and strengthen those in areas of Japan and the United States that have had limited exposure to the other society.

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<sup>68</sup> "On Reforming CULCON." April 27, 2007.  
[https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s\\_abe/usa\\_me\\_07/culcon200704.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe/usa_me_07/culcon200704.html).

<sup>69</sup> "Re-defining the Japan-U.S. Relationship" (2008).

<sup>70</sup> "Re-defining the Japan-U.S. Relationship" (2008).

4. Encourage and support networking among the diverse actors involved in Japan-US arts and cultural exchanges in both the non-profit and commercial realms.
5. Consider expansion of exchanges beyond “Culture and Education” in the narrow sense, but focusing on areas which would create opportunities for constructive communication.

As the United States and Japan built closer security ties, CULCON accordingly continued to redefine the bilateral cultural and educational relationship. In 2010, CULCON established five new discussion groups: performing arts and cultural exchange, Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), grassroots exchange / the JET Programme, and think tanks / interuniversity networks. For performing arts and cultural exchange, the Arts Dialogue Committee (ADC) was set up to build a framework for cooperation and exchange among curators.<sup>71</sup>

CULCON established the bilateral ETF (Education Task Force) in 2012 to expand student mobility, and in 2014, established the Educational Exchange Review Committee (ERC) to monitor ETF’s reports and implementations.<sup>72</sup> In 2015, CULCON set up the Ad Hoc Steering Committee (ASC), which aimed to rebuild a network of leaders in U.S.-Japan relations, as well as foster the next generation of leaders. Based on ASC’s report, in 2016, panelists agreed to set up the Next Generation Task Force (Next Gen TF).<sup>73</sup>

Since the 1990s, CULCON has continued its activities with ad hoc committees and task forces, seeking ways to expand educational, cultural and intellectual exchange in an era when the status of the United States and Japan are in relative decline.

When CULCON was established, there was mutual distrust between American and Japanese people. CULCON intended to eliminate such distrust, especially in the private sector, thereby strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In a way, the recent focus on security means that CULCON has returned to its origins. On the other hand, CULCON achieved a certain amount of success in the 1970s and 1980s, when it kept away from the chaos of the U.S.-Japan conflict, instead exploring ways to deepen bilateral cultural exchange. When we consider history in the long-term, being engaged in contemporary political and economic issues may not always be prudent. Those

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<sup>71</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON.” June 11, 2010.

<sup>72</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON XXVI.” November 17-18, 2014.

<sup>73</sup> “Joint Statement of CULCON XXVII.” June 17, 2016.

involved with CULCON must consider its future by finding a delicate balance between political and economic issues and intellectual and cultural exchange.

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